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Abstract-  The analysis of system calls is one method 
em- ployed by anomaly detection systems to recognise 
mali- cious code execution. Similarities can be drawn 
between this process and  the behaviour  of certain  
cells belong- ing to the human  immune  system, and  
can be applied to construct  an  artificial  immune  
system.   A recently developed hypothesis  in 
immunology,  the Danger  Theory, states that our 
immune system responds to the presence of intruders 
through sensing molecules belonging to those invaders, 
plus signals generated by the host indic- ating danger 
and damage. We propose the incorporation of this 
concept into a responsive intrusion detection sys- 
tem, where behavioural information of the system 
and running processes is combined with information 
regard- ing individual system calls. 
 
1 Introduction 
 
Malicious code execution through the exploitation of soft- 
ware vulnerabilities can allow an intruder to compromise 
a host running the software.  The running of any process 
on a machine generates system calls, providing interaction 
between application, operating system and hardware. Ana- 
lysis of the system calls made by a process, through the 
verification of system call usage, can reveal the execution 
of malicious code. Previous research attempted to identify 
the exploitation vulnerable software by detecting anomalies 
present in system call (‘syscall’) traces [hofm98][krug03]. 
Research in this area frequently utilises the construction of 
system call profiles during the legitimate operation of mon- 
itored programs. During the detection process, any syscall 
sequences or arguments that do not comply with the pre- 
viously generated ‘normal’ profiles are regarded as a sign 
that the system is compromised. Although these approaches 
have produced promising results, they can produce high 
rates of false positive errors, an issue which has yet to be 
resolved.  As outlined in [tan02], this may arise from the 
fact that the environment comprising the ‘system’ is largely 
ignored 
The key objective of our work is to propose a solution to 
this problem by taking inspiration from the Human Immune 
System (HIS). A hotly debated hypothesis in immunology, 
known as the Danger Theory [matz94][matz02] illustrates 
that the HIS can detect danger in addition to the collection 
of proteins known as antigens in order to trigger appropri- 
ate immune responses. Similarly, in the case of utilising sy- 
scalls to detect malicious code execution, we argue that the 
presentation of data must be coupled with its environmental 
conditions to create a sense of context. 
Previous research into computer security within the bio- 
logically inspired field of Artificial Immune Systems (AIS) 
has focused on detecting intrusions through the use of al- 
gorithms based on the self-nonself theory of immunogen- 
icity.  This theory dictates that the immune system is ac- 
tivated by the presence of ‘non-self’ or foreign proteins, 
and is a prevalent hypothesis in immunology[aick04]. How- 
ever, there are numerous instances where this classification 
fails. For instance, there is no immune response to foreign 
bacteria in the gut or to food and conversely, some auto- 
reactive processes exist, causing diseases such as rheum- 
atoid arthritis and multiple sclerosis.   The Danger The- 
ory challenges this viewpoint, arguing that foreign invaders 
cause damage to the host, thus inducing the release of cell 
molecules (termed danger signals) by detecting cell stress 
and death[matz94].  These signals are exposed to antigen 
presenting cells, which in turn initiate immune responses, 
due to the correlation of the signals. Similarly, we propose 
a system which encompasses various features of the danger 
theory to provide context to existing system call data, and 
generating an appropriate response. 
 
2 Approach 
 
2.1 Dendritic  Cells and Danger Signals 
 
Dendritic cells (DCs) are ‘professional’ antigen presenting 
cells, specialised for presenting collected proteins (antigen) 
in combination with their environmental context.  This in- 
formation is presented to effector T cells [manf02], causing 
the recognition and removal of pathogens.  Following mi- 
gration to the lymph node, antigen is displayed with con- 
text signals by DCs, which can activate ‘naive’ T cells.  T 
cells expressing a complimentary receptor for the antigen 
are activated if presented in a dangerous or ‘necrotic’ con- 
text.  Conversely, a safe or ‘apoptotic’ context causes any 
matching T cells become tolerised to that particular protein. 
The context information is translated using the differen- 
tiation pathways of the DCs.  DCs exist in three matura- 
tion states: immature(iDC), semi-mature (smDC) and ma- 
ture (mDC). Initially, when a DC enters the tissue, it exists 
in an immature state. The function of an iDC is to collect 
cellular debris from the tissue via ingestion.  Debris com- 
prising of protein is extracted and stored, in preparation for 
presentation. However, presentation of antigen to T cells via 
iDCs results in the deactivation of the T cell, as it does not 
express the necessary costimulatory molecules or inflam- 
matory cytokines (local chemical messengers) required for 
full T cell activation. 
However, if the tissue is damaged as a result of a patho- 
genic infection or other cell stress, ‘danger signals’ are re- 
leased into the tissue. Additionally, pathogens like bacteria 
express proteins which can be recognised through specific 
receptors (pattern recognition receptors) on DCs,  which 
have evolved over millions of years and are highly con- 
served.   These pathogenic proteins are known as patho- 
gen associated molecular patterns (PAMPs).  Exposure to 
PAMPS, danger signals or both, causes the full maturation 
of an iDC, initiating migration out of the tissue to the lymph 
node. On disruption of the membrane, a cell undergoes lysis 
and releases all of its contents into the surrounding area. A 
number of molecules found only inside of cells, such as uric 
acid, appear in the interstitial fluid. The signals are an in- 
dicator of cell stress, implying danger is present within that 
particular tissue. Inflammatory cytokines produced by other 
mDCs in the area can have an amplicative effect on both the 
PAMPs and danger signals. The cellular effects of exposure 
to PAMPS and danger signals result in increased production 
of the costimulatory molecules necessary for T cell bind- 
ing, and the expression of cytokines which activate naive T 
cells. This can lead to a full adaptive immune response. 
Conversely, if the tissue is healthy and the cells are not 
under stress, apoptosis is the dominant kind of cell death, 
resulting in the regulated dismantling of the cell. This en- 
sures that the cell contents are disposed without entering 
the interstitial fluid. The presence of cytokines released as 
a result of apoptosis, bind to different receptors on the DC, 
again, modifying the output cytokines expressed. This res- 
ults in the increased production of the costimulatory mo- 
lecules (as with the mDC), but the increased production of 
different cytokines. The cytokines released by the so called 
’semi-mature’ DCs are thought to tolerise T-cells to the anti- 
gen presented, and to produce regulatory T-cells which also 
have a suppressive effect. 
Essentially, DCs have the capacity to act as biological 
anomaly detectors [gree05]. They combine multiple signal 
inputs (in the form of PAMPs, danger signals, inflammatory 
cytokines and apoptotic signals), process volumes of anti- 
gen and provide T cells with essential context information 
regarding the health of the tissue. An abstracted model of 
these cells forms the basis of the anomaly detection com- 
ponent of our system, given their ability as natural danger 
detectors.   In order to apply a dendritic cell inspired al- 
gorithm for the detection of malicious code execution, a 
suitable mapping for antigen and signals must be formu- 
lated. 
Each DC is programmed with a simple multi-signal pro- 
cessor and antigen collector function. The signals represent 
the context for the collected antigen1 , and a unique signal 
mapping schema is applied. PAMPS are represented by vi- 
olations of security policies created by a system call checker 
such as systrace [prov03].  These are signature based sig- 
nals, like proteins that we know to come from pathogenic 
sources.   The danger  signals represent the behaviour of 
the process, with deviations in the behaviour increasing the 
level of danger within the system. Conversely, the continu- 
ous normal behaviour of the processes generates safe sig- 
 
1 The details of an antigen used by the AIS are discussed in section 2.2. 
nals. Inflammatory cytokines are not enough to initiate full 
DC maturation, but give an indication of the health of the 
tissue, and therefore can be mapped to examining the gen- 
eral behaviour of the host machine. Specific examples and 
a summary of the four types of signal are provided in Table 
1. 
 
Signals Meaning Examples 
PAMP known to be 
pathogenic 
Security policy 
violation 
Safe Signals indicates
stable/normal 
conditions 
No de-
tectable change in 
process cpu load or 
memory usage 
Danger
Signals 
may indic- 
ate  changes  in 
behaviour 
Highly fluctuat-
ing process cpu or 
memory usage 
Inflammatory
Cytokines 
amplify
the effects of the 
other signals 
System load
average 
 
 
Table 1: Signals provided for malicious process detection 
 
The data comprising the ’antigen’ and ‘signals’ are cap- 
tured and stored ready for collection by a subset of the DC 
population. The signals are received and stored for collec- 
tion at various concentrations, relative to the level of devi- 
ation. Virtual output cytokines derived through combining 
the inputs are used to direct our response-generating T cells. 
The virtual DCs have three types of output cytokine con- 
centrations:  costimulatory molecules (CSM), mature cy- 
tokines and semi-mature cytokines. High concentrations of 
PAMPs and danger signals lead to a high expression of ma- 
ture cytokines, which can be further amplified in value by 
the addition of inflammatory cytokines. Conversely, the ap- 
optotic signals are used to increase semi-mature cytokine 
expression, and to suppress the effects of PAMPs. The re- 
ceipt of any kind of signal results in an increased level of 
CSM expression.  Once the concentration of CSM reaches 
a threshold, the DC can collect no more antigen or signals, 
and is removed from the tissue and sent to the lymph node. 
 
2.2 Antigens and T cell Maturation 
 
In an immunological context, antigens are defined as 
substances which can initiate adaptive immune responses 
[coic03].  When applied to our system, the execution of a 
program - a process, can be regarded as a collection of anti- 
gens. Should the program be exploited, this will change the 
expected behaviour of the process. Once this is detected by 
the DC population, the T cell component of the system must 
respond accordingly - delaying or stopping the execution of 
the malicious code. Therefore, system calls comprising the 
process being exploited can be viewed as antigens, and have 
the capacity to stimulate an active response. As a running 
process generates a large number of system calls, antigens 
are a subset of the total syscalls executed. 
Our system captures antigens (sets of syscalls) by us- 
ing a system call policy checker tool, systrace [syst03] . 
These antigens are further fragmented by the DC popula- 
tion, forming antigen-peptides, a further subset of the total 
syscalls for a scrutinised executable.  Various sets of anti- 
gen peptide can be extracted from an antigen multiple times, 
by multiple DC. This is both in terms of different sequence 
lengths and sampling rates.  Hence, a population of DCs 
present a set of system calls in diverse forms together with 
antigen contexts, which are represented by output cytokine 
concentrations. 
In the HIS, DCs interact with naive T cells which have 
the capacity to differentiate further into effector T cells 
[coic03]. Naive T cells are newly created cells which have 
not encountered antigen and do not yet exhibit immune re- 
sponse functions, such as cell destroying abilities.   They 
have a specialised receptors type called TCRs which vary 
greatly between T cells. This receptor facilitates the bind- 
ing between the TCR and presented antigen peptides. Naive 
T cells are activated when the TCR- antigen peptide bind- 
ing affinity is sufficiently high and the necessary CSMs and 
cytokines are present in large enough concentrations. The 
activated T cells gain the ability to proliferate and their 
clones begin to differentiate into effector T cells.   These 
cells present in distressed or inflamed tissues recognise in- 
fected cells by binding their TCRs to pathogenic antigen 
peptides on target cell surfaces. 
In the AIS, naive T cells are generated when smDCs 
or mDCs carry antigen peptides to artificial lymph nodes. 
TCRs of naive T cells are created by randomly sampling, 
combining and generalising the antigen peptides passed 
from the DCs.  Specifically, different combinations of sy- 
scall sequences and partial strings of syscall arguments be- 
come TCRs of naive T cells, which can be signatures of an 
on-going attack.  Our AIS uses an individual policy state- 
ment, which is generated by systrace, to represent TCRs 
of naive T cells. Systrace itself monitors system calls pro- 
duced by a running program and it forces actions such as 
denying or permitting system calls based on a pre-defined 
policy [prov03]. The system call policy consists of a num- 
ber of policy statements, which have a ‘condition’ part de- 
scribing the states of monitored system calls and an ‘action’ 
part addressing actions to be taken when the condition part 
is observed. We define the condition part of the individual 
policy statement as the TCR, and the action portion as vari- 
ous types of computer immune responses. 
In order for naive T cells to acquire activation,  they 
constantly interact with smDCs and mDCs present in the 
lymph nodes.  Whenever DCs interact with naive T cells, 
the presented antigen peptides are evaluated based on sat- 
isfactory matching with the TCRs (the condition parts of 
individual policy statements) of the selected T cell.  Fol- 
lowing a successful match, the three output cytokine con- 
centrations of the presenting DC are examined.  Naive T 
cells interpret three categories of DC output cytokines. High 
concentrations of mDC cytokines are translated attack as- 
sociated antigens, with high concentrations of semi-mature 
cytokines indicating normal system function. Additionally, 
the value of expressed CSM indicates that the DC has been 
exposed to sufficient signals to permit presentation. Hence, 
if single antigens are captured at regular time intervals, the 
CSM value indicates that the output cytokines are accumu- 
lated over a long period time. This kind of information can 
provide more fine-grained evidence to support the decisions 
made over the generation of the appropriate response, per- 
haps giving rise to fewer false positives. Naive T cells have 
two numerical values called activation values and tolerance 
values that reflect the accumulated results of DC output cy- 
tokine concentration examination. These values indicate the 
state of naive T cell maturation. Upon this value reaching a 
pre-defined threshold, naive T cells finally become effector 
T cells. The activation and tolerance values are increased by 
the mDC and smDC cytokine concentrations respectively. 
 
2.3 T cell Differentiation and Responses 
 
Whenever naive T cells are created, they are assigned a 
lifespan and an age.  The lifespan indicates the maximum 
period of timesteps which the naive T cells can survive and 
interact with DCs, and the age represents the length of the T 
cell-DC interaction. When the activation or tolerance values 
of the naive T cells exceed the predefined thresholds before 
their ages reach the lifespans, the naive T cells become ef- 
fector T cells.  If the threshold is not reached the T cells 
are subject to permanent deletion.  This acts to safeguard 
against a number of false positive and negative errors, that 
could arise as a result of over-generalisation on behalf of the 
T cell. 
The type of response generated by the effector T-cell is 
dependent on which value reaches the threshold first. The 
allotted responses of the effector T cells are presented by 
the ‘action’ parts of the system call policy statements, pre- 
viously used to represent the TCRs. If the activation value 
triggers T-cell differentiation, a ‘deny’ action is given as the 
response of the effector T cell. A ‘permit’ response is gen- 
erated if differentiation does not occur. The effector T cells 
with TCRs and associated responses start monitoring new 
system call traces.  Whenever new system calls satisfy the 
TCRs of effector T cells, the AIS takes the actions which are 
presented as the responses of the effector T cells. Two types 
of responses can be generated - system call permission and 
denial, both implemented using systrace. 
In order to maintain a sense of homeostasis, effector 
T-cells have a controlled lifespan in addition to naive T- 
cells. New system call policies presented by newly differen- 
tiated effector T cells are applied only during their restricted 
lifespan.  However, a subset of these effector T cells, ap- 
propriately termed memory T cells, can remain for a longer 
period of time than the initially defined lifespan. In the HIS, 
the approximately 90 percent of effector cells die after their 
responses or lifespans, the rest remain as memory [coic03]. 
Memory T cells are known to have an increased capacity for 
survival.  Many factors contribute to the generation of ‘ef- 
fector memory’, with the exact biological mechanism still 
to be determined.  For our AIS, we are also currently ex- 
amining a number of possible immunological mechanisms 
which explains the memory T cell pool maintenance, and 
evaluating whether any of these explanations might provide 
a way to maintain memory effector T cells. 
3 Conclusion 
 
This paper introduces a novel artificial immune system that 
detects malicious code execution and responds appropri- 
ately.  The illustrated system implements various immun- 
ological mechanisms that are principally explained by the 
Danger Theory.  The key assumption that our system at- 
tempts to verify is that our AIS is able to i) detect a danger 
from environmental conditions, ii) extracts and generalises 
attack signatures from the data associated with the detected 
danger, and iii) hence responds to an on-going attack appro- 
priately. 
The implementation of such a system has been progress- 
ing using systrace, which is a system call policy checker. 
Various signals describing the behaviours of monitored pro- 
cesses and hosts are processed by a population of dendritic 
cells (DCs).  The processed signals coupled with antigens 
(sets of system calls) are presented to naive T cells. Three 
groups of signal processing outcomes lead naive T cells to 
differentiate to effector T cells, presenting attack signatures 
and a selected response, to permit or deny a system call. 
Whilst the proposed system automatically updates the 
system call policy of systrace as a result of artificial immune 
responses, it does not aim to oppose the manual policy gen- 
eration method currently used by systrace. Instead, our sys- 
tem is designed to extend an initial policy which is construc- 
ted defined by a user. There are already available publically- 
audited policies, including the Hairy Eyeball project. This 
project introduces systrace policies of nearly two hundred 
vulnerable programs [hair]. It is very common for a user to 
re-use these policies in order to save their time or select rel- 
atively reliable choices of policies. However, these policies 
do not cover all malicious or benign system calls regard- 
less of whether they are manually predefined by a user, or 
reconfigured from publically-audited policies. 
Currently systrace adopts two modes to handle system 
calls which do not match any policy statements. The user 
is asked to decide whether to deny or permit a system 
call. During this process the monitored program pauses un- 
til a decision is received, with the appropriate action then 
taken. In contrast, the artificial immune responses initiated 
by our system are expected to handle this situation auto- 
matically. The long hours of user absence or default denial 
can cause unnecessary program halt.  In addition, the ad- 
opting publicly-audited policies requires some reconfigura- 
tion of the policies to ensure suitability in the new environ- 
ment. Artificial immune responses controlled by our system 
would be able to automate the reconfiguration of publically- 
audited policies. Similarly, our system would allow an auto- 
mated update of policies in line with changes in the local 
computing environment. 
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